Meilicke and the CJEU Case Law on the Limitation of the Temporal effects of the CJEU
In preliminary ruling cases the CJEU interprets the relevant provision of Union law. The domestic court referring the case to the CJEU has to decide whether a provision of its domestic law complies with or infringes Union law. However, the CJEU avoids deciding on the meaning of the domestic provision which is at stake in the case at hand. It just repeats the meaning of the domestic provision as explained by the domestic court and even avoids giving judgment on whether the concrete domestic provision infringes Union law. According to the concept of shared responsibilities between the CJEU and the domestic court, the CJEU regards itself as limited in its competence and to only be allowed to interpret Union law 3 . Of course, it gives its judgment in the light of a domestic provision as that had been described by the domestic court. However, the CJEU usually does not take a stand whether the description provided by the domestic court is the most convincing interpretation of the domestic rule or even accurate. Interpretation of domestic law is just not within the competence of the CJEU.
The CJEU interprets Union law and, at least in its own perception, does not create Union law.
The Court just explains the meaning of the law as it should always have been understood.
Consequently, a judgment of the CJEU provides an interpretation that reaches back to the day when the Union law provision went into force. Thus, CJEU judgments usually have automatic The Court emphasizes that "the equal treatment of the Member States and of other persons subject to Community law" has to be guaranteed. The equal treatment of Member States can also be guaranteed if all of them have the opportunity to request a limitation of the temporal effects of a certain judgment at the same time. This does not necessarily mean that such a limitation has effect for all Member States. However, an equal treatment of all "persons subject to Community law" makes it necessary that the temporal effects of a judgment are limited either throughout the European Union or not at all.
where a limitation on the temporal effects of a judgment is ordered, it only applies to the Member State to which it was granted. Thus, the territorial scope of exceptions to ex tunc effect is restricted." In Banca di Cremona she explained her position in detail 9 : "However, any temporal limitation and any exception thereto decided upon by the Court will be based on an assessment of the situation -existence of good faith on the part of the State, risk of serious disruption for the State and need for effective judicial protection of diligent claimants -in Italy, and that assessment might be quite different with regard to another Member State which also applied a tax having the same characteristics.
[…] That consideration implies that any limitation should be not only temporal but also, in effect, spatial -a point of some relevance in the present case since it appears from several of the numerous articles which have already appeared in legal and tax journals concerning this case that one or more Member
States other than Italy may apply taxes which, at least in the opinion of some authors, share certain characteristics with IRAP."
At first sight the recent Skoma-Lux decision seems to be on the territorial scope of judgments of the CJEU 10 . This case dealt with a Union law rule which was in effect already before the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union and had never been translated and officially published by the EU in the Czech language 11 . The Court held that this rule cannot have any binding effect in the Czech Republic. From that perspective the territorial scope of the judgment was limited. The Court was also asked to limit the temporal effects of its judgment. However, the CJEU held that its Defrenne case law was not relevant in such a context 12 : "However, that case-law concerns a different situation from that before the Court.
In fact, in the present case it is not a question of limiting the temporal effects of a judgment of the Court concerning the interpretation of a provision of Community law, but of limiting the temporal effects of a judgment which concerns the actual enforceability, in a Member State, of a Community act. Consequently, that case-law cannot be applied to the present case."
Therefore one cannot conclude from Skoma-Lux that the Court wanted to deviate from its decision in Meilicke.
Though the CJEU does not seem to accept territorial limitations when it decides to limit the temporal scope of a judgment, the Court has never explicitly taken this view, either in
Meilicke or in any other later judgment. However, under the assumption that no such territorial limitation can be made it seems to be interesting to examine how this fits into the existing case law and how the Court would apply its usual criteria to limit the temporal scope of a judgment. Therefore, I will describe the criteria used by the CJEU in more detail (section II) 13 and then apply them in the framework just described (section III).
The Existing Case Law on the Limitation of Temporal Effects of CJEU Judgments

The Rule and the Exception
The Court gives the following reasoning why its judgments in general have retroactive 
Serious Economic Repercussions
From there is a structural problem, since no other party is either willing or able to come up with other serious calculations. Therefore, on the one hand, it makes sense to require the government to provide real evidence. On the other hand, for governments this is, for the reasons mentioned above, an almost impossible task. In Meilicke the Court explained that the relevant judgment had already been 
Limitation of Temporal Effects: Applicable in all Member
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, paragraph 215)."
It is obvious that the legal questions referred to the CJEU usually differ from case to case.
Even if the European law provision which is at stake is identical, the domestic legal framework of the case differs. Although the CJEU has no competence to interpret domestic law, it has to interpret Union law in the light of the case at hand and therefore indirectly in the light of the domestic provisions which cause the potential infringement. At least in respect of technical details such domestic provisions differ from Member State to Member State.
Sometimes the details of a domestic provision are not very different but they are embedded in another legal context. Therefore, it is almost never the case that the CJEU has to decide on a legal question which is completely identical to the question it had to deal with in a previous case. Therefore, determining the "actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought" depends on the level of abstraction.
Meilicke and Verkooijen have in common that both cases had been on dividends paid by a foreign corporation to a domestic shareholder. In both cases the taxpayers were individuals and the cases therefore dealt with individual income taxation. This is also true for Lenz and This illustrates that it is extremely difficult for governments to guess which case is the appropriate one to request a limitation for the temporal effects. Only one judgment is the correct one, and they may learn later from the CJEU that they have already missed their opportunity. In Meilicke the Court took the view that Verkooijen would have been the appropriate case. The deliberations above demonstrate that the Court also had good reasons to consider Baars or Manninen the appropriate judgment. However, unlike Meilicke none of these cases was a German case. Therefore, governments have to observe all cases very carefully, and not only the ones stemming from their own countries, in order not to miss their opportunity.
Good Faith and Legal Uncertainty
Meilicke could also have the implication that the temporal effects of a judgment have to be the same throughout the European Union 63 . If the Court limits the temporal effects of a judgment, this can then only be done for all Member States. This might have further implications for the application of the criteria under which the Court is willing to accede to a government's request.
The CJEU requires the Member State that is asking for the limitation of the temporal effects to put forward arguments why the legal situation had to be considered uncertain. 
Serious Economic Repercussions
The second relevant criterion for a limitation of the temporal effects of a judgment is that otherwise there would be "serious economic repercussions". In tax cases one of the most relevant questions in this respect is the budgetary implications. It has already been noted how difficult it is to measure these and that it is almost impossible for the governments to come up with appropriate evidence. are concerned, the other Member States could benefit from the economic repercussions raised by that system, if they ask for a limitation of the temporal effects of the CJEU judgment.
Conclusions
The general approach of the CJEU in respect of the temporal effects of its judgments is understandable from a policy point of view: The Court wants to make sure that its judgments have retroactive effect as a matter of principle. Otherwise, Member States would not take the Court seriously, in particular not in tax cases. They will only observe Union law requirements if they have to fear that they might otherwise suffer severe economic consequences and that they might be forced to pay back a considerable amount of their tax revenues. However, at the same time it is understandable that the CJEU wants to leave the door open in order to limit these effects, if necessary. A retroactive application of its case law could in exceptional cases lead to an undesirable financial disaster for one or more Member States. The CJEU sees a need for an "emergency brake". However, it is questionable whether the criteria developed by the Court in order to maintain this possibility really fit. Since the Court regards a limitation of the temporal effects of its judgment to be a rare exceptional situation, the standards to meet the criteria for such a limitation are extremely high. It is almost impossible for governments to meet them. Governments could consider it almost cynical if they are asked to provide evidence which often is almost impossible to provide. Meilicke has further complicated the rules of the game for the Member States: They have to request this limitation in the appropriate case. Appropriateness depends on the level of abstraction and it is impossible for the governments to foresee which case the CJEU will retrospectively consider to be the relevant one. In order not to miss any opportunity they have to come up with self-accusation as early as possible: A government will only be successful with its request for a limitation of the temporal effects in a case stemming from another Member State if it can convince the Court that its own tax system infringes Union law and that a judgment will lead to serious economic repercussions for its country. It goes without saying that the position of such a government will be rather weak when they have to defend the same tax rule in a later case and argue that the relevant Union law provision is not applicable to it. If the CJEU in Meilicke has really developed its case law further in the direction that temporal effects of judgment can be limited only for all or for no Member State, requesting a limitation of these effects becomes even more challenging for governments and the consequences arbitrary. The legal situation in a single Member State might be decisive as to whether the CJEU may grant the limitation of temporal effects to all the others. For all these reasons the Court would be well advised, on the one hand, to maintain its case law according to which only in exceptional cases judgments do not have retroactive effect and, on the other hand, to develop more transparent and operational criteria under which it is willing to distinguish between the rule and the exception.
